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ABSTRACT
In April 1993, the Basle Committee on Banking Supervision released a series of
consultative papers relating to the supervisory treatment of market risk within banks'
trading portfolios.  The papers proposed a method of allocating capital to cover risk
from banks' trading positions in debt securities and equities, as well as exposure to
foreign exchange risk across the entire bank.  This study assesses the efficacy of the
proposed methods for measuring risk and allocating capital to exposures from
traded debt securities, traded equities and foreign exchange.  The analysis draws on
actual portfolio data from banks, as well as random hypothetical portfolios,
measured against historical movements in debt and equity prices and exchange
rates.  The conclusions drawn are broadly that the capital charges generated under
the proposed methods are conservative, when measured against historical changes in
portfolio values.  In the case of the debt securities and foreign exchange proposals,
the capital charges are reasonably well correlated with risk in portfolios; higher risk
portfolios attract higher capital charges.  However, in the case of the equity risk
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1. INTRODUCTION
The 1988 International Accord on Banking Supervision - the  Basle Accord -
introduced a new regime for defining, measuring and determining minimum levels of
capital within the international banking system.  The Accord was founded on the
principle that banks should hold a minimum level of capital which should be linked
directly to the risks faced by banks in their operations.  The Accord was the product
of the Committee on Banking Regulations and Supervisory Practices, a group
formed in the early 1970s by the supervisory authorities of the G10 countries.  Its
risk-based capital adequacy standards subsequently became the model for
supervisory structures, not only for member countries of the G10, but in a range of
other countries, including Australia.
The scope of the Accord was limited in the sense that it addressed only one aspect
of risk facing banks; credit risk or the risk of loss associated with counterparty
failure.  The focus on credit did not deny the presence of other types of risks and it
was acknowledged explicitly that market-related risks arising from the effects of
changing prices (interest rates, exchange rates and equity prices) should also be
taken into account by supervisors in framing prudential policy for banks.
Over recent years, the Basle Committee has conducted work on formally including
market risk in the capital adequacy framework.  The first stage of that work was
completed in early 1993 and a series of 'consultative' papers were released for
discussion and comment.  The market-risk proposals1 consisted of three separate
proposals to measure risks arising from banks' trading activities in debt securities
and equities markets, and in relation to their foreign exchange exposures.  The
                                                                                                                                  
1 Basle Committee on Banking Supervision (1993),The Supervisory Treatment of Market Risk,
Basle, April.2
proposals set out procedures for applying capital charges commensurate with those
risks.2  The Reserve Bank prepared a detailed submission to the Committee,
drawing on analysis and empirical work and on comments from Australian banks.
The  Basle Committee is reviewing the proposals in the light of all comments
received.
This paper summarises the three proposals and describes some simple empirical
work to test their efficacy in covering potential losses from banks' market-related
portfolios.
Section 2 provides some background to the development of the market-risk
proposals while Section 3 considers some of the main structural features of the
proposals.  Sections 4, 5 and 6 deal with the traded-debt proposals, the traded
equity proposals and the foreign exchange proposal respectively.  A brief
conclusion, in Section 7, touches on some of the main policy issues raised by the
proposals.
2. BACKGROUND
Deregulation of international financial systems over the 1980s was accompanied by
a period of high price volatility in financial markets.  Increased volatility in the
prices of financial instruments and other financial assets opened new opportunities
for profit for financial institutions from the trading of those instruments.  With those
new opportunities, however, came the potential for losses.  While banks' market-
related exposures remained relatively small and actual losses minimal, the case for
the formal recognition of market risk within the supervisory structure did not seem
strong.  The growth in market-related exposures began to accelerate, however,
especially over the latter half of the 1980s.  The nature of banks' exposures to the
market also changed; the traditional risks associated with large holdings of fixed-
interest securities remained but were supplemented by additional risk associated
with the rapid growth in off-balance sheet and derivative markets.  While banks
were becoming increasingly large players in those markets, the risks were still small
                                                                                                                                  
2 At the same time as the release of the market risk proposals, the Basle Committee released a
proposal covering the treatment of bilateral netting for capital adequacy purposes and a
discussion paper on the measurement of interest rate risk across the whole of a bank's
operations.3
when measured against credit risk arising from their traditional lending activities.
Concerns, however, were focused more on future developments, and the possibility
that banks' exposures in these areas would continue to expand.
It was against that background that work on the prudential treatment of market risk
began.  As it progressed in the final years of the 1980s and into the 1990s, three
separate, though related, themes emerged as the main factors driving the market-risk
exercise internationally.
1. A desire to see the existing capital adequacy framework generally expanded
and strengthened;
2. A desire to remove distortions within the banking sector that may have arisen
from the focus of capital standards on credit as opposed to other forms of risk;
and
3. A desire to achieve greater consistency in supervisory treatment between
international banking and securities regulators.
The first of these themes was a direct consequence of the market developments
noted above.  The case for expanding the capital framework grew stronger with
growth in market exposures faced by banks.  Increasing complexity of market-
related instruments added to problems in identifying and assessing exposures.
The second reflected a growing recognition of the possible consequences of
focusing supervisory effort on one aspect of risk; namely, the encouragement of
alternative forms of risk taking by banks.  It can be argued that the existing capital
standards, by focusing largely on credit risk, provided a strong incentive for banks
to turn their attention towards activities where credit risk was deemed low from a
regulatory perspective, but where non-credit-related risks may be greater.  Many
have pointed to the growth in banks' off-balance-sheet/derivative business as
evidence of that process.   A strong case can be made that inconsistencies in
supervisory arrangements should not bias banks' activities in particular directions.
The third motivation was broader in concept and concerned the desirability of
applying consistent supervisory standards to institutions doing similar forms of
business.  While few would argue the case for equal supervisory treatment across all
financial institutions, it is the case that competitive inequalities can arise when one4
set of institutions doing similar, or in some cases identical business, is supervised
more rigorously than others.  Internationally, that debate on competitive inequality
focused on the regulatory treatment of the international security houses vis-a-vis the
banks; in particular, the concern that differing supervisory treatment carried the
potential for a significant shifting of business towards the unregulated or less
regulated group.  These concerns, while always present to some degree, increased
as the distinctions between banking and non-banking activities blurred and as banks'
market activities came to mirror, more and more, the activities of the international
securities houses.  An important catalyst to the work on market risk was the desire
to develop consistent supervisory guidelines for these two groups of institutions.
One consequence was that in developing the market-risk proposals, the  Basle
Committee sought assistance from  IOSCO (International Organization of Securities
Commissions).  IOSCO was represented on the various technical working parties
whose task it was to develop the details of the market-risk proposals.  The intention
was that the regulatory guidelines that emerged would represent a joint product of
the banking and securities regulators and would be applied equally to banks and
securities houses.  For a variety of reasons, those joint arrangements broke down in
early 1993.  However, the structure of the proposals as they were released still
reflects the input of the securities regulators.
Having determined that some form of regulatory arrangement was necessary to
supervise banks' market-related activities, debate turned to the issue of how that
objective could be achieved.  Two difficulties emerged; one philosophical, one
practical in nature.
At the broadest level was the issue of how to reconcile the introduction of new
regulatory arrangements with the objective of improving market efficiency, one of
the main goals of financial deregulation.  It was broadly accepted  that with financial
deregulation came a greater emphasis on, and need for, prudential supervision.  The
question at hand, however, was the form that any expansion in the supervisory net
to capture market risk should take.  Over the latter part of the 1980s, for example,
many financial institutions invested heavily in the development of tailored risk-
management systems to handle their growing levels of market risk.  An important
issue that arose in the development of the proposals was the extent to which banks'
own risk-management structures should be taken into account or recognised in
extending the supervisory structure.  To what extent, for example, would any5
separate supervisory guidelines on market risk represent a duplication of what
financial institutions had already put into effect on a voluntary basis?  That issue
remains current and is one of the key issues examined by the Basle Committee.
The more practical and immediate problem was how to translate the objectives of
the market-risk exercise into a workable set of guidelines with applicability across a
range of countries.  The credit standards introduced in 1988 were able to achieve
that by adopting a very simple approach involving a regime of risk weights applied
to different credit exposures.  While the assumptions on which that model was
devised have been heavily criticised, the willingness of countries to implement the
credit based standard over recent years has been assisted by their relative simplicity.
It is doubtful that highly complicated credit standards would have enjoyed the same
degree of international support that the current standards have had since their
inception.  The market-risk guidelines had the potential for much greater complexity
than those covering credit risk.
The Committee tried to address the conflict between the inherent complexity of
capturing market risk and the practical need for simplicity by taking a two-step
approach.  It involved:
• development of a 'standard' approach towards the treatment of market risk
which was relatively simple in scope.  The standard model formed the basis of
the proposals; and
• introduction of some alternatives, within the standard approach, which would
allow sophisticated banks to use more elaborate techniques in calculating the
risks associated with their market activities, for example breaking down swap
positions into cash flows from each interest payment.
Irrespective of which approach was adopted, it was emphasised that none of the
techniques proposed to identify or measure market risk (either in the standard model
or the more sophisticated options) was intended as a substitute for banks' own
internal risk management systems.  The objective was solely the creation of a
structure to permit the calculation of a capital charge that provided a reasonably
accurate assessment of banks' actual market-related exposures.
The main focus of this paper is on the standard methodologies proposed for
calculating the capital charges and whether those simple methodologies are6
sufficient to provide an estimate of the risks associated with market-related
instruments.  For the foreign exchange proposal, an alternative simulation method
proposed by the Basle Committee is assessed and compared to the standard method.
3. STRUCTURE OF THE PROPOSALS
While the three proposals vary in terms of structure and complexity, they share
some common features.  In particular:
• they all focus on the need for capital to cover market risk.
Other methods of risk control, such as use of internal limit systems (without
explicit capital coverage) were considered as alternatives to an arrangement
requiring dedicated capital for market risk.  Supervisors in some countries
already have such arrangements in place.  These alternative approaches were
dismissed on the grounds that:
- only physical holdings of capital can, in the final resort, provide an
institution with a buffer against losses.  Limit-based systems, although
generally linked to capital, only set an upper bound on the losses that
might be experienced by an institution; and
- only a structure based on holdings of capital could be viewed as
consistent with the current capital adequacy standards.
• the focus of the proposals is on the market risks found in a bank's 'trading
book'.
As structured, the proposals were not intended to cover all market-related risks
faced by banks.  While the proposals cover all foreign exchange risk incurred
by a bank, only positions in debt instruments or equities held for short-term
trading purposes are captured.  The proposal does not define the trading book
precisely; the implicit assumption however, is that it covers those instruments
which are held for trading, as opposed to longer-term investment and which are
marked to market at regular intervals.  The focus on the trading book as the
basis for measuring and applying a capital charge to market risk reflected two
factors.  The first was the technical difficulty in estimating the market risk
associated with traditional banking activities i.e. borrowing and lending.  The
treatment of market risk across the whole bank was considered as an issue to7
be addressed in the longer term.  The second factor was that by concentrating
on risk in the trading book, it captured the sorts of activities carried out within
dedicated securities firms, and was therefore consistent with the objective of
creating a regulatory structure applicable to both banks and securities firms.
• the proposals assume, implicitly, that risks are additive.
It is assumed that the individual market risks associated with changes in
exchange rates and interest rates, and arising from variations in equity prices,
can be summed and added to the associated credit risks to form an overall risk
position.  This methodology is referred to in Basle literature as the 'building
block' approach.  The proposals do not approach risk from a portfolio
perspective; that is, they do not seek to identify and take into account the
presence of inter-relationships between various types of risk (for example,
relationships between exchange rate movements and changes in security
yields) and build those empirical linkages into the risk measurement system.
The following sections look at each of the three proposals, covering traded-debt
instruments, foreign exchange and equities.
4. TRADED-DEBT SECURITIES
The first of the proposals, and the most complex, covers market risk on traded-debt
securities and related instruments.  Although banks carry interest rate risk on many
of their assets, the impact of changing interest rates is most obvious, and
quantifiable, when looking at traded-debt instruments and debt-derivative products.
Under the proposed arrangements, the capital requirement for securities in the
trading book consists of two separately calculated charges:
• the first relates to credit risk (and is termed 'specific risk.')  It is defined as the
risk that the price of a particular security will rise and fall with changes in the
creditworthiness of the issuer.  The capital charge arising from specific risk is
intended to replace that levied under the present credit based capital
requirements.  However, as shown below, the basis of calculating the capital
requirement for credit risk varies from that adopted under current capital
adequacy arrangements; and8
• the second capital charge will cover  the 'general market risk', of the portfolio;
that is, the risk of price movements arising from changes in the general level of
interest rates.
4.1 Specific Risk
Specific risk applies to all long and short trading positions in debt instruments and
in related derivatives.  This differs from the current capital adequacy arrangements
where only long positions in debt instruments (i.e. assets actually held) are subject
to a capital charge.  The broadening of the arrangements to include short positions
recognises that the creditworthiness of an issuer can improve or deteriorate over
time, and therefore the price of those particular securities can rise and fall relative to
those of other issuers.3
Under the proposals, the following capital charges are applied to cover specific risk:
Commonwealth Government securities 0.00%
Qualifying securities:
less than 6 months residual maturity; 0.25%
between 6 and 24 months residual maturity; and 1.00%
greater than 24 months residual maturity. 1.60%
All other securities 8.00%
The 'qualifying' category includes debt and related instruments of local and state
government authorities, other public sector entities, banks and high-quality
corporates.
A corporate security will be deemed qualifying if it is:
• rated investment grade4 by at least two credit rating agencies specified by the
supervisor;
• rated investment grade by one credit agency and not less than investment grade
by any other agency specified by the supervisor; or
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excluded.
4 For example, rated Baa or higher by Moodys and BBB or higher by Standard and Poors.9
• unrated, but deemed comparable to investment grade by the bank  and the
issuer has securities listed on a recognised stock exchange.
The specific risk charges outlined in this proposal differ in key respects from those
applied under the capital adequacy guidelines; the most significant being the
introduction of a concessional risk weighting for 'qualifying' debt.  In the Australian
market, this would mainly cover debt issues of high-quality corporates which, under
the present standards, attract a uniform 8 per cent capital charge.  The capital
charges proposed for such issues would, therefore, be considerably lower than those
levied under the present system.  It would also open a large gap between capital
charges applying to banks' holdings of debt securities of high-quality corporates and
loans made to them by banks.  This may provide incentives for banks to facilitate
lending via the issue of debt, rather than lend directly to these companies or
institutions.  That approach, if adopted, would represent an important change in
supervisory practice, carrying implications for the pattern of financing within the
banking system.
4.2 General Market Risk
General market risk refers to the risk associated with changes in the level of interest
rates.
The method proposed to calculate capital charges to cover general market risk
requires that instruments5 be slotted into a maturity ladder made up of thirteen
maturity bands.  A capital requirement is then determined based on the concept of
potential change in the value of the portfolio.
For each position within a given time band, a calculation is performed to estimate
potential change in value. The change in value of any particular position will reflect
three factors:
• the size of the position itself.
• the change/s in yield assumed for the purposes of the calculation.
                                                                                                                                  
5 Instruments which are included are: long and short positions in physical debt securities;
notional underlying positions of derivative instruments such as futures, forwards and swaps
(both legs of the swaps are included, each in their appropriate time band); and options on the
basis of the probability of their being exercised (delta equivalent basis).10
The larger the interest rate variation built into the calculation, the larger the
potential loss, and therefore the more conservative any resulting capital charge
will be.  For the purposes of determining the capital charge, the standard
method assumes that the change in yield should be sufficient to cover two
standard deviations of historical movements in yields over a one-month period;
and
• the price sensitivity of the position to changes in yield.
The sensitivity of the underlying securities which make up a position to
changes in rates is technically more complicated to calculate.  Here a relatively
simple modified-duration methodology is adopted.6  Rather than calculate the
actual duration of each security using individual cash flows, the standard
method estimates the modified duration for each separate time band, based on
an assumption that all securities carry an 8 per cent coupon rate, an 8 per cent
yield and a maturity equal to the mid point of their time band.7
The assumed change in yield and the modified duration can then be combined to
produce a single 'market-risk weight' for each time band.  Current market values of
individual positions are multiplied by the market-risk weight appropriate to their
time band.  These are summed within each time band to give a net open position
which represents the potential change in the value of all positions in the time band.
Potential changes in value for each time band must then be combined in some way
to provide a measure of the overall change in value of the portfolio.  The simplest
way to achieve this would be to simply net, within and across time bands, all of the
measured potential changes in value.  That simple netting approach is only
appropriate if actual yield curve movements follow the yield curve movement
assumed in the risk-weighting process.  Underlying the risk-weighting process is an
assumed yield curve shift ranging from 100 basis points at the short end to 60 basis
                                                                                                                                  
6 Duration is a technique used to measure the price sensitivity (i.e. risk) of a security or a
portfolio.  Price sensitivity is greater for securities (or portfolios) with longer maturities and/or
lower coupon rates.  Duration provides a useful measure of this price sensitivity by taking both
factors into account.  In mathematical terms, the concept of 'modified duration' measures the
price sensitivity of a bond to a small change in interest rates.
7 The proposals allow banks with sophisticated risk management systems to calculate the exact
duration for all individual positions, and use these more accurate measurements in calculating
risk-weighted positions.11
points at the long end.8  This assumes that when the yield curve shifts as a result,
say, of a shift in short-term interest rates, the movement of the curve is always the
same.  That assumption can rarely be justified.  The shape of the yield curve will
tend to change with changing short-term yields.  Further, securities within the same
time band may not exhibit the same price changes due to factors such as small
maturity differences and the liquidity of different issues.
To take these complexities into account, so-called 'disallowance factors' are
introduced to cover:
• imperfect correlation of price between different securities within a given time
band ('basis risk'); and
• imperfect correlation of price across different time bands ('yield curve risk').
The following two sections describe these disallowances in some detail, and
illustrate how they would impact on the calculation of the total capital charge.
4.2.1 Vertical Disallowances to Cover Basis Risk
Within any particular time band, long and short risk weighted positions are offset,
leaving a net open position.  However, in recognition of the fact that each time band
will include positions whose  maturities are not identical, a 10 per cent vertical
disallowance is applied to one side of the matched positions in each time band.
To illustrate, consider a bank which held the following positions in the
6 to 12 month maturity band9 on January 1, 1994:
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9 The risk-weighted position of securities within the 6 to 12 month time band is calculated as
0.7 per cent of market value.  This represents the product of the duration weight of 0.7 and the















Treasury bonds 12.5 30/09/94 3,571 0.70 25
Telecom bonds 13.0 15/11/94 -57110 0.70 -4
Bank bills 7.5 15/11/94 -1,429 0.70 -10
Diagrammatically, this 'portfolio' can be considered as below.
Figure 1
Long (Asset) Short (Liability)
14 14
11 Net
In this portfolio the sum of the weighted long positions in the time bands is
$25 million and the sum of the weighted shorts is $14 million.  The net open
position in the time band is therefore a long position of $11 million.  That amount is
then carried forward to be used in the calculation of the horizontal disallowances
covering yield curve risk (as described below.)  The amount which has been offset
attracts a capital penalty of 10 per cent.  In this time band, $14 million of long and
short positions have been offset against each other.  The vertical disallowance of
10 per cent is applied, resulting in a capital charge of $1.4 million.
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4.2.2 Horizontal Disallowances to Cover Yield Curve Risk
To cover yield curve risk, the standard method aggregates the thirteen time bands
into three time zones and applies horizontal disallowances to cover opposite
positions in different time bands and zones.  The concept of capital charges based
on offsetting positions in different time bands is analogous to that described above
for vertical disallowances for offsetting positions within time bands.  For example,
where a bank has a net long risk-weighted position in the first time band (0-1 month
maturity) and a net short position in the second time band (1-3 month maturity), the
two positions may not be offset without taking into consideration the lack of price
correlation between positions in the two time bands.  As the differences in maturity
are greater between time bands than within time bands, the disallowances factors
applied are correspondingly higher.
The horizontal disallowance structure is summarised below.
Table 1: Horizontal Disallowance Structure Offsetting Within and Across
Time Zones








Zone 1 up to 1 month
1 to 3 months 40
3 to 6 months
6 to 12 months
40
Zone 2 1 to 2 years
2 to 3 years 30 150
3 to 4 years
40
Zone 3 4 to 5 years
5 to 7 years
7 to 10 years 30
10 to 15 years
15 to 20 years
over 20 years
To illustrate, if the bank has net open positions in each time band as follows:14
Example 2












Zone 1 up to 1 month 100 0.00 -
1 to 3 months 500 0.20 1 (3)
3 to 6 months (3,750) 0.40 (15)
6 to 12 months 1,570 0.70 11
Zone 2 1 to 2 years 1429 1.40 20
2 to 3 years (1364) 2.20 (30) (15)
3 to 4 years (167) 3.00 (5)
Zone 3 4 to 5 years 685 3.65 25
5 to 7 years 559 4.65 26
7 to 10 years (172) 5.80 (10) 40
10 to 15 years (133) 7.50 (10)
15 to 20 years 103 8.75 9
over 20 years 10.00 -
Total 22 (a)
The capital charges within time zones will be:
Zone 1 (0.4 x 12) 4.8
Zone 2 (0.3 x 20) 6.0
Zone 3 (0.3 x 20) 6.0
16.8 (b)
The capital charges between time zones:
Zone 1/2 nil
Zone 2/3 (0.4 x 15) 6.0
Zone 1/3 (1.5 x 3) 4.5
10.5 (c)
The capital charge against general market risk in this case will be $49.3 million; the
sum of the totals at (a), (b) and (c) above.15
The capital charge calculated for the net open portfolio position, plus the vertical
and horizontal disallowance factors calculated within and across time bands, can be
added to yield a figure, measured in dollar terms, of the capital charge for general
market risk.  To that total is added the separately calculated capital charge for
specific risk to give the full capital requirement for the trading book of debt
instruments.
4.3 Underlying Assumptions
The previous sections describe the calculation of the capital charges under the
standard method proposed by the  Basle Committee.  The calculation of capital
charges on general market risk in the debt securities proposal relies on assumptions
relating to:
• the volatility of interest rates;
• the structure of disallowance factors; and
• holding periods.
The following three sections consider the appropriateness of these assumptions in
the context of the Australian market.
4.3.1 Volatility Assumptions
The proposal specifies interest rate (yield) shocks across the maturity profile of
between 100 basis points for debt with maturities up to a year, to 60 basis points for
instruments with maturities of 10 years or more.  The appropriateness of capital
charges generated by the model will depend therefore, on whether those changes in
yield are representative of the volatility observed in the local market.  If volatility is
less than assumed, the resulting capital charge will be too high.  Conversely, if
volatility is greater than assumed, capital charges would be insufficient to cover the
required proportion of losses.
To test the plausibility of the assumptions, they were measured against actual
volatility of interest rates in the Australian market over recent years.  Figure 2 shows
the results of that analysis.16






















































Levels of interest rate volatility vary depending upon the time period examined.
Australian volatility has declined since 1990, especially at the short end of the yield
curve.  While the volatilities assumed in the proposal involve some overstatement at
the short end of the yield curve, there was a tendency for some understatement of
volatility at the medium to longer end.  Those differences will lead to some
misspecification of the capital charges.  However, in a well-diversified portfolio, it
may be that the effects of these departures from the Basle assumptions balance one
another out.
4.3.2 Vertical and Horizontal Disallowances
A system of disallowances can be viewed as a means of improving the accuracy of
the standard model.   However, to be effective, the disallowance factors should bear
a direct relationship to the price correlation between securities of different
maturities; a factor which will also vary according to local market conditions.  The
appropriateness of both the horizontal and vertical disallowances can be assessed by
looking directly at the correlations between the prices of different securities.
Table 2 sets out actual price variations of securities across different points of the
yield curve based on an analysis of five years of actual data.  It shows that the
degree of correlation of monthly price changes is relatively high across securities of
different  maturities.  For the Australian market, the proposed horizontal17
disallowances would appear to overstate significantly the true degree of price
variation across the maturity spectrum.



















30 day 1.00 Zone 1
13 week 0.81 1.00
26 week 0.76 0.96 1.00
1 year 0.66 0.86 0.92 1.00 Zone 2
2 year 0.53 0.72 0.80 0.92 1.00
3 year 0.47 0.68 0.76 0.89 0.97 1.00
5 year 0.43 0.63 0.72 0.85 0.95 0.98 1.00 Zone 3
10 year 0.31 0.49 0.57 0.69 0.80 0.86 0.90 1.00
15 year 0.28 0.51 0.51 0.61 0.80 0.85 0.90 1.00 1.00
4.3.3 Holding Periods
The modified duration methodology applies interest rate movements to the portfolio
based on two standard deviations of monthly volatility of interest rates at various
points along the yield curve.  Potential losses are based on monthly movements in
interest rates (yields).  Implicit in this approach is the assumption that a banks will
suffer losses incurred over a month before acting to close out positions or taking
other action to minimise losses.  Market practitioners have argued that this
assumption is unrealistic and not representative of actual behaviour.  Banks tend to
liquidate unfavourable positions much more rapidly than assumed.  If this were the
case, the effect of this assumption would be an unduly harsh capital penalty.11  The
counter argument to this is that in many instances, traders do not close out
unfavourable positions if they believe that the movement in market yields is merely
an aberration.
                                                                                                                                  
11 It should be noted also that the monthly holding period is inconsistent with the traded equity
and foreign exchange proposals which only assume a two-week holding period.18
4.4 Empirical Analysis of the Traded-Debt Securities Proposal
Two sets of tests were performed to assess the efficacy and coverage achieved by
the capital charges generated under this proposal.  The first involved testing the
proposal against a small number of actual bank portfolios of debt instruments
against actual interest rate movements.  Comparisons were then made between
losses that would theoretically have been recorded and the level of capital that
would have been required under the proposal.
Because of the limited number of actual portfolios available, a second set of tests
were conducted based on a series of  randomly generated portfolios.  These
portfolios were created by assuming that the size of banks' long and short positions
in time band followed a uniform distribution between $0 million and $100 million.
Three hundred separate portfolios were generated by that method.
The portfolios were  revalued at monthly intervals using actual yields from the
Australian market over the period June 1988 to June 1993.  Losses and gains are
then calculated from the differences in the value of the portfolio, from month to
month, over the five-year period.  Two standard deviations of changes in the value
of each portfolio form the benchmark against which the capital charges are
compared.
Based on the sample of actual portfolios, the capital charge from the standard
method proved to be very conservative when compared to the monthly gains and
losses experienced by the portfolio.  On average, the capital charge covered
99 per cent of all losses.  If the portfolio is assumed to be held for a period less than
the four weeks specified in the proposal, say for two weeks, then the coverage
achieved by the capital charge increases dramatically.  The capital charge is
sufficient to cover all losses in the period examined (100 per cent coverage) and a
considerable buffer of capital above the worst loss is maintained.  Given that a
shorter holding period for securities within a trading book is not an unreasonable
assumption, the level of capital proposed by Basle, therefore, appears conservative.
The results from the simulation analysis on the hypothetical portfolios supports
these results.  On average, the capital charge covered 99 per cent of the simulated
losses on these randomly generated portfolios.  The 95 percentile losses (those
corresponding to two standard deviations of movements in the value of the19
portfolio) were compared with the standard capital charge.  In no case was the
capital charge inadequate to cover two standard deviations of losses, and in most
cases, excess capital above this level of loss remained.  The conservatism is further
emphasised by the fact that the portfolios generated did not take into account the
interest rate environment and the fact that actual portfolios will reflect the shape of
the yield curve.
An appropriate capital charge is required to do more, however, than to 'cover' all, or
most losses.  The ideal capital charge is one which tracks risk well.  Put another
way, there should be a strong relationship between the capital charge and the risk in
the portfolio.  (In this study, the proxy for risk is two standard deviations of
movements in the value of the portfolio; or, in other words, the 95 percentile loss.)
The analysis indicates that such a relationship exists between the capital charge
proposed by Basle and the losses incurred by the portfolios.  The Basle method was
tested against several alternatives to assess its relative performance.  An R2 statistic
was used to quantify the 'fit' of the losses to the capital charge.
The equations below detail the results of regression analysis of the linear
relationship between the 95 percentile losses (L95) and three capital charges,
including that proposed by Basle.  These capital charges are those derived from:
• the standard method proposed by Basle (BAP);
• a simplified version of the Basle model, using only 5 time bands and 2 time
zones and a correspondingly simplified horizontal disallowances structure,
(ALT); and
• an even simpler model (NET) which is the Basle model excluding the vertical
and horizontal disallowances.20
Regression results for debt securities capital charges:
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# indicates that the variable is significant at the 1 per cent level.  Standard errors are
shown in brackets.
Equation 1 indicates that there is a strong relationship between the Basle capital
charge and 95 percentile losses.  It is interesting, however, that the Basle capital
charge is out-performed by the much simpler net model.  This implies that the
horizontal disallowances do not improve the ability of the Basle capital charge to
measure risk.13  The  Basle Committee justifies the additional complexity of the
horizontal disallowance structure on the added accuracy it provides to the
measurement of risk.  The results obtained here question that argument, and suggest
that even simpler measures are equally effective.
The coefficients on the capital charge variables in equations are shown to be all less
than unity.  This implies that, on average, the capital charge overstates the risk
associated with the portfolio; less capital would be required to cover the losses
observed.  In the case of the standard capital charge (BAP), approximately
60 per cent of the proposed capital charge would be sufficient to cover 95 per cent
of all changes in the portfolio value.
                                                                                                                                  
12 Note that where regression equations are estimated without the inclusion of a constant, it is
possible to obtain negative R2 values.
13 The same cannot be said regarding vertical disallowances as the simulation process only
includes one type of security per time band - therefore basis risk between offsetting securities
in the same time band is not observed.21
The debt securities proposal is the most complex of the three market-risk proposals;
the concept of vertical and horizontal disallowances is unique to the debt securities
proposal, as is the use of more sophisticated risk measurement techniques such as
modified duration.  Empirical analysis indicates that the capital charge generated is
quite conservative; measured against a 95 per cent confidence interval; it is more
than sufficient to cover most losses which would be faced by a bank over a one
month period.  However, data from the simulation analysis indicates that simpler
versions of the Basle method perform equally well or better in covering losses.
5. FOREIGN EXCHANGE RISK
Consistent with the proposal on traded-debt instruments, the foreign exchange
proposal attempts to measure the risks associated with banks' foreign exchange
positions and apply a capital charge to cover potential losses.  The foreign exchange
proposal differs from the debt instruments proposal, however, in three respects:
• it is a generally simpler proposal;
• it does not attempt to draw distinctions between trading and non-trading
positions.  All foreign exchange positions are captured under the proposals;
and
• it provides a comprehensive alternative to the standard method, which is
intended to meet the needs of more sophisticated players in the foreign
exchange market.
5.1 The Standard Method
The 'standard' method measures banks' foreign  positions as the larger of its short
and long positions measured in terms of the domestic currency.  This approach is
presently used in the UK to apply a capital charge to banks' foreign exchange
positions and is used by the Reserve Bank in Australia to measure banks' foreign
exchange positions.14  This measure of foreign exchange exposure can be shown to
be equivalent to the average of a banks' net and gross position in foreign
                                                                                                                                  
14 The Reserve Bank also applies overnight limits on banks' foreign currency exposures.22
currencies.15  The implicit assumption behind this approach is that there is some, but
not perfect, correlation between currencies.












The net position of the portfolio in this example is $20 million.  The gross position
is $380 million.  The larger of the sum of the long positions or the sum of the short
positions is $200 million.  (Note that $200 million is also the average of the net and
gross positions of $20 million and $380 million.)
Having measured the foreign exchange position, the proposal recommends the
application of an 8 per cent capital charge.  The capital charge generated by the
portfolio above would be $16 million; 8 per cent of $200 million.
An adjunct to the capital requirements under the standard method is a 'de minimis'
exemption.  This exempts banks with foreign exchange positions which are small
relative to their overall capital base from holding any capital against foreign
exchange risk.  The stated purpose of this exemption is to avoid onerous
administrative burdens on banks with small foreign exchange operations.  The
                                                                                                                                  
15 The net position is defined as being the absolute difference between long and short positions;
the gross position is the sum of all positions regardless of sign.23
maximum exemption which would be permitted is 2 per cent of the bank's capital
base.  In our example above, the bank would not be required to hold capital against
the foreign exchange exposure if its capital base exceeded $10,000 million.  If the
bank's capital base is less than this amount (or its measured position larger), the
bank will be required to hold capital against the entire exposure.
5.2 The Alternative, Simulation Method
The more sophisticated approach is one that would allow banks' to use a more
complex simulation model to measure foreign exchange positions and risk, provided
they are able to satisfy their national supervisors that they have the necessary
measurement and control systems to implement such an approach.
The advantage of the simulation method is that it uses actual variance and
co-variance relationships of exchange rates to more accurately track risk.
The simulation method is conceptually simple.  Past exchange rates movements are
used to  revalue the bank's present foreign exchange positions and calculate
simulated profits and/or losses which would have arisen if those positions had been
held for two-week periods over the past 5 years.  The capital requirement is then set
in relation to the simulated losses which would have arisen during that period.
The simulation method involves;
• calculating the net aggregate value of the bank's current foreign exchange
portfolio for every working day of the last five years, using actual exchange
rates.  The result is a series of 1,300 daily observations (5 days by 52 weeks by
5 years);
• calculating the change in the value of the portfolio over rolling two-week
periods.  This provides a time series of two-week changes in the value of the
portfolio; and
• the capital charge would be levied, equal to the 65th largest loss (5th percentile
from 1,300 observations), that is it represents a 95 per cent confidence interval
of losses from the portfolio.24
Where the simulation method is adopted, a 'scaling factor' has been introduced; an
additional capital charge, equal to 3 per cent of the foreign exchange position
measured by the standard method.  The purposes of the scaling factor are stated to
be:
• to determine the 'toughness' of the capital requirement;
• to produce a capital charge equivalent to that delivered by the standard method;
and
• to ensure that at least a minimum capital charge was applied to banks' foreign
exchange exposures.
The addition of the scaling factor detracts from the accuracy of the simulation
method as a means of tracking risk.  Moreover, the objectives of the scaling factor
could be achieved by other means without the loss of this accuracy.  For example, a
change in the parameters of the simulation method, increasing the holding period of
the portfolio to 3 weeks or the level of confidence required to 99 per cent, would
achieve the first two of the objectives noted above, while a floor imposed on the
amount of capital required to be held, perhaps based on the standard method, would
achieve the goal of ensuring a minimum capital requirement.
5.3 Empirical Analysis of the Foreign Exchange Risk Proposal
The previous two sections described the proposed methodologies to calculated
capital charges against foreign exchange risk.  In this section, these methodologies
are considered in the context of typical Australian bank exposures to foreign
exchange and the exchange rate environment observed over recent years.
The data used in the statistical analysis are the weekly data on foreign exchange
positions supplied by individual banks to the Reserve Bank.  An 'overall' foreign
exchange position, in terms of long and short positions in each currency, was
calculated by summing the net open cash positions and foreign currency options25
positions16 and consolidating across global operations.  The foreign currency
position information is categorised by currency, with nine major foreign currencies:
US dollar, Canadian dollar, Japanese yen, Deutschemark, British pound sterling,
New Zealand dollar, French franc and Swiss franc.  Any residual foreign currency
exposures, categorised as 'other currencies', were ignored in this analysis on the
basis that they represented an insignificant proportion of the overall exposure.
Reported foreign exchange positions were assumed to be held for two weeks.  The
changes in the value of the portfolio over this fortnight were calculated on the basis
of observed changes in exchange rates over the same period.  The two-week
convention, initiated by the Basle Committee in testing the proposal, is based on
considerations of how rapidly bank portfolio losses due to exchange rate changes
could be recognised and acted upon by banks.  This is a conservative approach as it
does not recognise that banks may change their positions rapidly in response to
adverse changes in market conditions; hence a certain 'comfort level', whereby
banks are assumed to have suffered greater losses than is probably the case, has
been built into the study.
Losses and gains on all foreign exchange portfolio held between 1992 and 1994
were calculated for each reporting bank.  It was possible therefore to calculate or
isolate a loss consistent with coverage of two standard deviations of portfolio value
movements (95 percentile losses).  The 95 percentile losses are then used to assess
the efficiency and coverage of each measure of foreign exchange risk.  The
relationship of the losses to the various measures of foreign exchange positions is
calculated, and estimates of the optimal capital charge to be applied to each method
found.17
                                                                                                                                  
16 The Reserve Bank of Australia has a two-tier system for monitoring banks' exposures from
foreign currency options.  Banks that have sound mathematical models to calculate a "cash
equivalent" of their foreign currency exposures generated by options written or held may use
these to calculate the extent of the exposure.  Bank with less sophisticated systems calculate
foreign exchange options positions at face value.  Both tiers of banks were used in this analysis
as a statistical homogeneity test established that the tiers were not significantly different.
17 One of the most common problems encountered in cross sectional regression analysis of this
type is heteroscedasticity, where the variance of the errors is not constant.  In this case, it was
found that variance increased with the size of the positions held.  The heteroscedasticity was
appropriately corrected for by performing weighted least squares estimation using  the sum of
Net and Gross positions as a scaling factor.26
The following capital charges associated with each of the banks' 95 percentile losses
(L95) were calculated:
• standard Basle calculation without any de minimis exemption (BAP);
• capital charge based on simulation method using 95 percentile losses from the
simulation process, without the 3 per cent scaling factor (SIM); and
• capital charge based on the simulation method using the 95 percentile losses
from the simulation process (SIM), with the 3 per cent scaling factor (based on
the standard Basle calculation, BAP).
Efficiency requires that there be a strong linear relationship between the positions
measured and the losses incurred.  The closer the relationship is, the more efficient
is the capital charge.  The equations below summarise the results of linear
regression analysis.
Regression results for foreign exchange capital charges:
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# indicates that the variable is significant at the 1 per cent level.  Standard errors are
shown in brackets.
The results indicate that the simulation method is a more efficient measure of risk
than the standard method.  The R2 statistic on the standard method is 0.93, lower
than that obtained for the simulation method with or without the 3 per cent scaling
                                                                                                                                  
18 Strong collinearity exists between the two explanatory variables in equation 6.  The lack of
significance of the BAP variable is a reflection of this phenomena.27
factor.  The R2 statistic in equation 6 indicates that the scaling factor (BAP) has no
impact on the ability of the simulation method to measure risk.
The coefficient on the variable SIM in equation 5 indicates that the simulation
approach is also quite conservative - only about 70 per cent of the simulation capital
charge is required to cover the 95 per cent losses incurred by the portfolios.  These
results are sensitive to the exchange rate environment against which they are tested.
In a less volatile environment, such as that seen in recent years in Australia, the
capital charges may appear even more conservative.
The coefficient on the variable BAP in equation 4 gives an indication of the size of
the capital charge which should be applied under the standard method.  Based on
our data, the optimal charge to cover 95 per cent of all losses, is around
1.9 per cent.  Doubling the losses from the data set and calculating the optimal
weight for the standard method gave a result of 3.7 per cent, still well below the
8 per cent proposed by Basle.  Put in other words, capital equal to around 4 per cent
of the standard method would be adequate to cover twice the hypothetical losses in
the data set.
This is considerably lower than the 8 per cent recommended charge.  The Basle
Committee have acknowledged the conservative nature of their 8 per cent capital
charge.  Their justification for the maintenance of 8 per cent includes the difficulty
in monitoring reported positions, particularly intra-day exposures, and the difficulty
in measuring risk associated with options and other derivative products.
In summary, the results indicate that for Australian conditions, an 8 per cent charge
on the standard method of calculating foreign exchange exposures is very
conservative.  The results also show that the alternative simulation method is a more
efficient measure of risk than the standard method and that there is little need for a
minimum scaling factor.
6. EQUITY RISK
The equity risk proposal envisages a capital standard to cover the risk of holding
positions in traded equities and related derivative instruments.  The requirements
will also apply to all instruments which exhibit market behaviour similar to equities.28
Equity instruments which can be treated as traded debt (some forms of preference
shares for example) would be covered by the guidelines for interest rate risk.
Consistent with the building block philosophy, two areas of risk are identified as
arising from traded equity positions:
• specific risk, which deals with the risk of a price movement confined to one
particular equity or derivative product linked to it (credit-related risk); and
• general market risk, which concerns price movements that are unrelated to any
specific equity.
6.1 Specific Risk
It is proposed that the specific risk of a bank's portfolio under the proposal is
measured against the gross equities position, that is, the sum of long and short
equity positions.  The approach assumes the specific risk associated with any single
equity instrument is unrelated to the specific risk of any other equity.
The main focus of debate has been the appropriate level of capital to be applied
against specific risk.  The equities proposal recommends that a capital charge of
4 per cent be applied where diversified books of liquid portfolios are involved.
Where less liquid equities or portfolios are concerned, an 8 per cent charge is
recommended.  This differs from similar market-risk guidelines put forward by the
European Economic Community through the latest Capital Adequacy Directive19
which regard a 2 per cent capital charge as sufficient where a liquid portfolio is
concerned.  As in the previous case, 8 per cent is viewed as the appropriate charge
where less liquid equities or portfolios were concerned.  It is viewed as the
responsibility of the respective supervisor to determine which equities, or portfolios,
would be deemed 'highly liquid.'
6.2 General Market Risk
The general market risk of the portfolio is measured by the net equities position.
That is, short positions in one set of equities can be used to offset the general market
risk arising from long positions in other equities.  The implicit assumption here is
                                                                                                                                  
19 These guidelines are due to be implemented by the EEC in 1996.29
that there is perfect correlation between movements in equity prices.  This
assumption is acknowledged as unrealistic, but is adopted in the interests of
simplicity.20
A capital charge of 8 per cent of the net position is proposed to cover market risk.






BHP ordinary shares 230
GIO Australia 100
Western Mining Corp 120
General Property Trust Income 75
Woolworths 50
TOTAL 330 195
For this portfolio, the gross position is $525 million and the net position,
$135 million.  The total capital charge, assuming this is considered a liquid and
diversified portfolio, would be $31.8 million; $21 million against specific risk and
$10.8 million against general market risk.
                                                                                                                                  
20 It will be recalled that in the debt securities proposal, full offsetting was permitted as a means
of calculating the general market risk of a portfolio but disallowance factors were introduced
to modify the outcome.  Effectively, only partial offsetting was allowed.  No such disallowance
factors are introduced in the equities proposal.30
6.3 Empirical Analysis of the Equity Risk Proposals
The previous sections discussed the proposed structure of the capital charge to
cover equity position risk.  In this section, the performance of that capital charge is
measured against actual share price movements in the Australian equity market.
Australian banks' exposures to equity risk is not as significant as exposures to price
risk on debt securities and foreign exchange risk, mainly as a consequence of
regulatory restrictions on banks' equity holdings.  As a result, data on typical equity
portfolios are not readily available.  However, a number of banks have stockbroking
subsidiaries whose exposures will attract a capital charge.  A small sample of actual
portfolios was obtained from banks in that position.  These actual portfolios were
supplemented by a large number of randomly generated portfolios.
The randomly generated portfolios were created from a selection of around 60
shares traded on the Australian Stock Exchange.  The equity portfolios were created
assuming that the size of banks' long and short positions in each stock followed a
uniform distribution between $0 and $100 million.  Three hundred portfolios were
generated in this way.
The portfolio was revalued at fortnightly intervals using actual prices for each of the
stocks making up the portfolio.  The losses and gains on the overall portfolio were
calculated from the differences in the value of the portfolio over a five year period
from January 1988 to February 1993.  A change of two standard deviations in the
value of these portfolios was used as a benchmark for evaluating the performance of
the capital charge.
The capital charge associated with each hypothetical portfolio was calculated using
each of the following three methods:
• the standard capital charge proposed by  Basle; 4 per cent charge against
specific risk and an 8 per cent charge against general market risk (BASLE);
• the alternative capital charge proposed by the Economic Community as part of
their capital adequacy directive which sets 2 per cent against specific risk and
8 per cent against general market risk (CAD); and31
• an alternative methodology used by the Securities Exchange Commission in the
US which is different to both of the above (SEC).  The SEC rules require that
capital of 15 per cent be held against the gross position of the portfolio.
Hedging of long or short positions is permitted to the extent of 25 per cent of
the longer side of the portfolio, and is deducted from the capital charge on the
gross position.  The SEC approach does not attempt to separate risks into
specific and general market risk.
The coverage of the capital charges on the actual portfolios over the simulated
losses were not as conservative as the results from the debt or foreign exchange
proposals.  The standard method covered around 85 per cent of  all  portfolio
movements (i.e. both positive and negative movements).  In other words, around
30 per cent of  losses were not covered by the capital charge.  The SEC
comprehensive method performed somewhat better covering about 94 per cent of all
changes in portfolio value while the E.C. approach covered only 79 per cent of all
changes.
The results from the simulation analysis were consistent with the results from the
actual portfolios.  Coverage of the standard method was 91 per cent of all changes,
while coverage of the SEC and E.C. methods were 99 per cent and 79 per cent
respectively.  Figure 3 below indicates that there is no strong linear relationship
between the losses incurred and the capital charge obtained under the standard
method.  This is confirmed by the results of the linear regression analysis.32
Figure 3: Relationship Between Standard Equity Capital Charge and
Observed Losses
















































































Regression results for equity capital charges:
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# indicates that the variable is significant at the 1 per cent level.  Standard errors are
shown in brackets.
The results show that the capital charges have a highly significant regression
coefficient but a very low coverage of potential losses.  The R2 statistic shows that
none of the three methods are satisfactory in tracking the losses.  Further, the
coefficients on the dependant variables which may be interpreted as the 'amount' of
the capital charge which should be applied, indicate that the standard approach
recommended by Basle and the approach recommended by the European Economic33
Community are not adequate to cover two standard deviations in changes in
portfolio values.  In the case of the CAD method, the regression results indicate that
twice as much capital is required, on average, to cover the losses observed.
The performance of the capital charges can be shown to change with different
assumptions regarding the distribution of long and short positions held in the
portfolio.  The assumption underlying the results described above is that a bank is
equally likely to hold a long position as a short position; that is in a diverse portfolio
the average net position is zero.  Altering these assumptions, to bias the portfolio
towards long positions, significantly affects the efficiency of the capital charge.
Regression results for equity capital charges - bias towards long positions:
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# indicates that the variable is significant at the 1 per cent level.  Standard errors are
shown in brackets.
The difference in explanatory power between the two sets of results can be
interpreted as follows.  When portfolios are constructed to have an average net
position of zero, capital charges are too low, since the capital charge is a function of
the net position.  These capital charges are not well correlated with actual loss
experience.  When portfolios take on non-zero net positions, thus generating larger
capital charges, the linkage between the capital charge and the losses improves.  In
other words, the use of net positions to measure general market risk is
unsatisfactory.  Risk does not appear to decline as net positions take on smaller
values.  The assumption that equity prices are perfectly correlated does not hold,
and has a significant impact on the ability of the capital charge to predict losses.34
Results from this analysis indicate that the proposed capital charge for equities does
not cover as large a proportion of losses as the capital charges covering foreign
exchange or debt securities.  However, the problem is not that the size of the capital
charge is not sufficiently high, but rather that the method used to measure the risk is
not sufficiently accurate.  An inefficient method of achieving greater coverage of
losses would be to merely increase the amount of capital which is required to be
held.  Alternatively, the simple approach to measuring equity risk could be replaced
by a more sophisticated method which tracked risk more closely.  However, this
latter approach would be at odds with the Committee's objective of keeping
calculation of the capital charge as simple as possible.
7. CONCLUSION
The greatest impact of the new requirements will fall on those banks which are
active in the equities, debt securities and foreign exchange markets.  However,
despite growth in banks' market-related activities, the size of banks' market
exposures appears to be very small relative to traditional credit-related exposures.
The size of any additional capital requirements to cover market risk is, therefore,
likely to be correspondingly small.  Further, with capital ratios of Australian banks
currently averaging around 12 per cent, there would appear to be a large buffer of
excess capital to meet any additional capital charges arising from market risk
exposures.
However, there are two qualifications which should be made to that conclusion:
• as the size of market-related exposures increases relative to traditional credit-
related risks, the important issue becomes not how much capital is generated
by the proposals but whether these simple proposals represent an accurate
measurement of the risks involved.  In cases where banks conduct a wide
range of market-related transactions, risk may be better measured by
techniques which take into account correlations across products and
currencies.  Such complexities have not been introduced into this set of
proposals.  An additional factor to be considered is the extent to which the risk
associated with more complex or exotic financial instruments can be captured
within the relatively simple framework set out in the proposal; and35
• interpretation of the empirical results has suggested that the proposed capital
charges are conservative.  This conclusion should be assessed in terms of the
benchmark against which the charges are tested; 95 per cent confidence
intervals of two-weekly movements (monthly for debt securities) in portfolio
values based on historical market rates.  The losses which would be incurred
under exceptional market conditions (equivalent to the 1987  stockmarket
crash) fall outside the 95 per cent confidence band.  The proposed capital
charges may be inadequate to cover such extreme market movements.